Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Jack Allen Olson, et al. v. Salt Lake City School District, et. al. :
Memorandum Of Defendants-Appellants In Support of their
Appeal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Dan S. Bushnell and M. Karlynn Hinman; Attorneys for
Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Olson v. Salt Lake School District, No. 19055 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4602

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Dan s. Bushnell
M. Karlynn Hinman
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Salt Lake City
School District, Salt Lake
City School Board,
School Board Members,
Superintendent and Clerk
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-3680

Counsel for PlaintiffsRespondents:
James B. Lee
James M. Elegante
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone (801) 532-1234

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JACK ALLEN OLSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

SUPREME CT. NO. 19055
APPEAL FROM THE TAX
DIVISION OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY
(Civil No. C-81-5668)
(Hon. Kenneth RIGTRUP)

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS*
IN SUPPORT
OF THEIR APPEAL

*Salt Lake City School District, the Board of Education of Salt
Lake City, Board members Kump, Warner, Walker, Carman, Keene,
Evans, Matheson, Superintendent Donald Thomas and Clerk
Treasurer W. Gary Harmer.

FILED
JUL 8 -1983

MF.MORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

Table of Authorities
Statement of Points

iv

THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT

2

NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

The Plaintiffs.

2

2.

The Allegations.

3

3.

The Tri a 1 and the Record.

3

Definition of Terms.

4

a.

Reserve.

4

b.

Undistributed Reserve.

4

c.

The Contingency Appropriations
Account.

5

d.

Unexpended Fund Balances.

6

ARGUMENT
THF TWU MILL LEVIES MADE BY THE DISTRICT FOR
THE MA 1 i;n:nANCE AND OPERATIONS BUDGET ARE
IHlTHORIZED.
l I
'I [

·1·111::"[
I

I I

WA>-, NU ILLEGAL MILL LEVY.
'·I

'"IJRT'S DECISION RESTS ON

ThP
rhP

Process.
Jse of the Contingency Appropri-

-':it i1-J)1S

Account.

-i-

7

9

11
11
14

3.

The Undistributed Reserve.
a.

IV.

V.

4.

The Trial Court Has Ignored the
Statutory Limits on the Undistributed
Reserve in U.C.A. §53-20-2.

5.

The Unexpended Fund Balances.

6.

The Respondents' Admissions.

THE TRIAL COURT CONFUSED ITS TERMS AND
RELIED ON EXTRA-RECORD MATERIAL
1.

Since There Is No Exclusive
Reserve, Reserves Cannot Be
Distinguished by the Trial
Court.

2.

The Court Went Outside the
Record In Making Its Decision.

3.

The Contingency Appropriations
Account Is Not Secretive or
Mysterious.

THE REMEDY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
IMPROPER AND INAPPROPRIATE.
1.

VI.
VII.

VIII.

Legislative History and Purpose.

Attempts to Enjoin Taxation.

COURTS SHOULD NOT MANDATE ACCOUNTING
OR BUDGETING METHODS FOR THE DISTRICT.
SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD
UNLESS THERE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
OR CLEAR ILLEGALITY.
THE CREDIT RATING OF THE DISTRICT IS
PLACED AT RISK BY THE INCORRECT
DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

CONCLUSION

-ii-

25

OF AUTHORITIES

UTAH STATE roDE ANNOTATED
§53-7-9

6,

7,

§53-7-16

7

§53-7-18

8

§53-7-19

8

11,

42

5,

6,

6
§53-20-2

1,

3, 4,

10, 11, 12,
18, 19, 20,
23, 24, 25,
34, 42

§59-11-10
ll.

38

CASES
Bearct v. Board of Education
81 Utah 51, 16 P. 2d 900 (1932)

43

Boari of Eiucation of Salt Lake City v.
Burgon, 62 Utah 162, 217 P. 1112 (1923)

44

Penelke, Inc. v. John Price Associates,
642 r. 2d 1229 (Utah 1982)
r•.ct_t_y _v __
r
O.j

S'1°

) /QO

Inc.,

Board of Regents,
(Utah 1979)

rluar 1 ·:·.f F.duc3tion of Salt Lake City,
"cJ'1(iital\1930)

-ii

j -

40

44

40,

41

7,

16,
21,
32,

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

THE TWO MILL LEVIES MADE BY THE DISTRICT FOR
THE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS BUDGET ARE
SEPARATELY AUTHORIZED.
The state requires a levy of 23.25 mills,
and the voters have directed a levy of 9
mills, both of which levies were essential
to prevent the District from incurring
an unlawful deficit.

II.

THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL MILL LEVY
The District did not exceed the limits of
the two mill levies and did not collect or
receive excess amounts of tax money.
Courts
are not permitted to enjoin taxes, and their
injunctive power should not be used in an
effort to do indirectly that which cannot be
done di re ct 1 y.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION RESTS ON ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTIONS.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that
an accounting method (which is designed for
the appropriation of uncertain revenues) was
a funded reserve, that the so-called reserve
was equivalent to unexpended fund balances
and that a reserve of that sort would not be
proper, even though there are no statutory
provisions requiring school districts to
maintain only a single, exclusive reserve.
(See u.c.A. §53-20-2)
1.

The Budget Process.
The budgeting process requires estimates
to be made and involves discretion.
Both
revenue and expenditures involve
unpredictable events which cannot be known
when the budget is adopted before the
beginning of the coming school year.
Provisions must be made to meet the nee•ls
and uncertainties of budgeting.
-iv-

The Use of the Contingency Appropriations
Accounts

14

that some revenues can only be
hoped for but not relied upon to materialize, the District uses the Contingency
Appropriations Account to appropriate uncertain revenue.
As the year progresses,
if those revenues do in fact come in, then
the District will commit them.
It will
not spend against them until it is certain
they are there, even though the District
has many meritorious programs which could
use such funds.
3.

The Undistributed Reserve

19

Section 53-20-2 Authorizes districts to
create an undistributed reserve (in
specified amounts) which cannot be used
in the negotiation or settlement of contract
salaries.
The purpose of the limitation
is to isolate some revenue for the salary
negotiation and settlement process.
4.

The Trial Court Has Ignored the Statutory
Limits on the Undistributed Reserve in
u.c.A. §52-20-2.

21

If the undistributed reserve can (as
the trial court allowed) be used for
contract salaries once they are settled,
then that reserve is no longer isolated
from the salary bargaining process.
Those
neqotiating for salaries will know that
tlte District has more funds available;
they can force their release and require
their use for their benefit.
The llnexpended Fund Balances
IJnexpended fund balances are cash and
inventory which have not been expended and
thus still available at the end of the
hu,Jc3et year.
The law provides for their
arry-over to the next year's budget.
1'11ey

are

ncit

reserves or excessive

-v-

23

collection of revenue; they occur in the
fortunate circumstance that costs and
expenditures fell below estimates or that
revenue exceeded expectations.
6.

The Respondents' Admissions.
The Respondents have admitted all the
crucial points about budgeting and the
budgeting process; they have in fact
admitted their case away.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CONFUSED ITS TERMS AND RELIED ON
EXTRA-RECORD MATERIAL
1.

Since There Is No Exclusive Reserve,
Reserves Cannot Be Distinguished by the
Trial Court.

2.

The Court Went Outside the Record In
Making Its Decision.

3.

The Contingency Appropriations Account
Is Not Secretive or Mysterious
The trial court, confusing terms and
misconstruing a statutory provision,
ignored the factual record and relied on
material outside the record in reaching
its conclusions.
It failed to understand
the use of accounting methods, and thus
incorrectly thought them unavailable for
scrutiny.

V.

THE REMEDY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
IMPROPER AND INAPPROPRIATE.
1.

Attempts to Enjoin Taxation.
By law, courts cannot enjoin taxes; they
should not exercise their equitable
powers in such a way as to accomrlish the
-Vl-

r

same result in other ways, especially when
the relief they grant is ineffective and
meaningless.
111

COURTS SHOULD NOT MANDATE ACCOUNTING OR
BUDGETING METHODS FOR THE DISTRICT.

40

B,1cJgeting is an exercise of discretion; the courts
should not try to mandate particular budget accounts
in the absence of ministerial duty or illegality.
VII.

SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD UNLESS
THERE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR CLEAR
ILLEGALITY.

43

There is no abuse of discretion and no reason to
require the Appellants to use one account and
refrain from using another.
There is no
justification whatsoever for the use of the
injuctive power of the trial court.
VIII

THE CREDIT RATING OF THE DISTRICT IS PLACED AT
RISK BY THE INCORRECT DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL
COURT
An imprope

court's

and incorrect exercise of the trial

in unctive power should not be permitted

to Jeopard ze the District's favorable credit
rating.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
Yhe

case involves claims that the defendants-appellants

""''"'•"'(] the •n1 11 levy at too high a rate, incurring unexpended
• s•

t\.,,t

chose few taxpayers who paid under protest should

'"'' 1

rl1at

the ilefendants-appellants have created an

r .1, i 01

ted L>y U .C .A. §53-20-2 which allegedly

P<•.lusive reserve; and that use of the undistributed
',, "•ci

;y.J

hy u C.A.

§53-20-2 should be mandated.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The lo.Yer court granted injunctive relief to prohibit
the use of the particular accounting method,
Appropriations Account"
budget)

the "Contingency

(referred to as Item 0210.99 in the

and ordered that expenditures be made from

uted reserve.

The lo.Yer court reserved unti 1 after an appeal

on the injunctive relief the amount,

if any,

of a tax refund.

NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The defendants-appellants request that this Court
dissolve the permanent injunction and declare that they coul1
in the past and may in the future use the contingency appropriations account.

They also seek declarations 1) that the mil;

levy was proper,

2) that the undistributed reserve may not be

used in the payment of contract salaries,

even after salary

negotiations have been completed and salaries have been settl
for the forthcoming school term,

0

and 3) that the undistributec

reserve is not an exclusive reserve.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs-respondents

(the "Respondents") are

individual property owners or business and other entities
property in the Salt Lake City School District

(the "Dis-

trict").

They paid their property taxes for 1981-82 under

protest.

Many of the respondents are members of the Utan

Taxpayers Association

w•

(the "UTA"), which prepared the suit a:·
-2 -

'

,,,- i,

i

both plaintiffs and contributions to support the

t,,,J

suit

(Pec()rrl ["R."] 297,
: '"'Hson")

298)

Lead plaintiff Jack Allen

is the executive vice president of the UTA;

, owar'i Stephenson ("Stephenson")
11.T.A.

is a research analyst for

(Stephenson's name was transcribed "Stevenson" at his

deposition.)

(Olson Deposition ["Olson:] 3; Stevenson Deposi-

tion ["Steph."] 3)
'!'he Allegations
l'he Respondents allege that the Board of Education (the
"Board") and the District have set the mill levy too high for
fiscal

year 1981-82 and have created an unlawful reserve
in derogation of U.C.A.

§53-20-2, which authorizes

school districts to create an undistributed reserve.

The

Respondents allege that unexpended fund balances evidence the
-wer-col lection of tax revenue from the mill levies.

They

s0ught injunctive relief to prevent use of the Contingency
Account in the budget and to compel the
Pespondents to use the undistributed reserve.

They also seek a

'efond nf the alleged over-collections in amounts which have
Jprermined by the trial court.

Cieer1

1'c:e

l'r13l

rtnd the Record.

stipulation,
•

11

""'

1

""'l'e's

.;

'''''
·:.r1

t:_,

" ""

in

the trial court decided the case on the

Lhe record,

including deposition tran-

and exhibits.
i

l-1e

-

t_ t

ial

No live testimony was presen-

That court permitted its ruling on the

r ·'l 1 c>f to be appealed as a final order.

-3-

4.

Definition of Terms
a.

Reserve
A reserve is a funded account held in the ready to mec.

expenses which are frequently unpredictable.

Thus,

for

example, the District has been a self-insurer for health,
accident and unemployment insurance.

(See R.

336, Goldsberry Deposition ["Golds."] 101)

266,

237 [backs;,

Si nee no one can

predict what accidents will occur during the forthcoming year
or the costs of the accidents which do happen, the budget is
designed to set up a reserve available to cover accidents if
they occur.
b.

Undistributed Reserve
The undistributed reserve is a

rized by U.C.A.
gencies.

funded reserve autho-

§53-20-2 which can be used for limited contin-

It is undistributed in the sense that it is not

allocated to a particular item or function of the budget, but
may be used in any area permitted by the statute.

U.C.A.

§53-20-2 provides that the undistributed reserve:
"may not be used in negotiation or settlement
of contract salaries for school district
employees."
The District has followed this mandate and has never at any
time used any part of its undistributed reserve for contrac'
salaries.

Contract salaries are primarily the negotiaten,

contract salaries for teachers.

-4-

un,1istributed reserve is limited by statute to a

11,:-

,TidX11num ut 5% of a school district's maintenance and operation
budget; the amount permitted each district is deter-

i"'l.& O ")

mined by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (the
"State Superintendent").

U .c .A.

§53-20-2.

That figure has

been set at 1-1/2% of the M.& O. budget for Salt Lake.
c.

The Contingency Appropriations Account.
The budget account in question is a designated account

in the Instruction part of the District's budget.

Its sub-

number and title have varied somewhat during the years covered
by the complaint.

In 1980-81 it was an account assigned the

number 0210.99 (the "Contingency Appropriations Account").
Regardless of its subnurnber or name, its function has been the
same each year.

484 at 80)

(R.

The Contingency Appropriations Account (sometimes referred
to as the Line Item in the Record) represents an accounting
ne'hod used by the District to facilitate handling of uncertain

re··'enu-=s.

Uncertain revenues are appropriated through the

··,,nt1r.g""--" i>.ppropriations Account,

tn particular programs and accounts until the funds

tham
1r11

1

y

1

e'--ei ve(],

· 1,,,..,

'"•·1·w1

",'-lnl

_HP

most

1---

' -

'Jt

but the District does not

When and if those revenues do

redistributed to specific needy accounts

frequently within the Instruction area of

(,__,here contract salaries are handled).
tie

unecrtain revenue,

-5-

As an

the District may anticipate

receipt of a particular type of federal grant, but until
grant is actually made and the funds are present,

He

the

Appellants have been unwilling to spend against it.

The mone,

is hoped for but not certain; therefore, it is not committed
until it is actually in hand.

The Contingency Appropriations

Account permits the District to plan for the grant
optimistic view that it will materialize)
d.

(R. 484 at 80, 80-

Unexpended Fund Balances
By law, a school district's budget must be prepared

June, prior to the forthcoming school year.

The budget con-

sists of estimates of revenues and expenditures.
&§53-20-1,

53-20-2,

53-7-9.

ir.

U.C.A.

As the school or fiscal year

unfolds, the budget figures may be revised to account for
actual events.

(See R. 19-20, 31-36)

For each of the years

mentioned by the complaint, the District's initial budget
planned for estimated expenditures to equal estimated revenou,
(R. 484 at 51,

16-62, 65,

67)

As those years developed, there

were some expenditures which did not prove to be as large as
estimated, and some accounts showed revenue exceeding costs
year-end.

Such left over revenue is called an unexpended fur•'

balance or unexpended funds.

The unexpended fund balances ma,

consist of cash or inventory.
Section 53-20-2 of the u .C .A. provides,

in part' toa

All unexpended balances of appropriations at
the end of the fiscal year shall revert to
the funds from which they were appropriated
and shall be set up as revenue in the budget
of the following year.
-6-

(l,.'?r

"""Y 1,e

·•ords, the law has recognized that unexpended funds
and has provided for their carry-over to the

i ricurc<>d

next fis•·al year.

In 1981-82, the District allegedly had an

unexpended fund balance of approximately $2.8 million
(unaudited figure)

consisting of cash and inventory.

(R. 100)

The audited figure for school fiscal year 1981-82 was
$l,078,909,

less than half the amount alleged by the

Responclents.

( R. 231)

It shall be unlawful for any board of education to make any appropriation in excess of
the estimated expendable revenue, including
undistributed reserves, for the ensuing
fiscal year.
U.C.A. §53-20-2.
TI"le Respondents contend that the fact that the District has
year-end fund balances demonstrates two things:

first that the

mill levies set by the District have been too high and have
resulted in collection of too much money (which the plaintiffs
seek to be refunded)

and second, that the unexpended fund

balances are a hidden or secret reserve kept in the Contingency
;ppcopriat\ons Account in derogation of the provisions of

u.r .. r1o §53-20-2.
a1"'

totally

Analysis demonstrates that these contentions

l;icking in merit.
TWO MILL LEVIES MADE BY THE DISTRICT
r ''R THf: MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS BUDGET
!"\RE SEPARATELY AUTHORIZED.

THf'

I''µ
1
'd

I

« ,·

1•

y

r

>o.t11ct

U1e

1,0

1."

1>

One is

St ate and the other is directed by the voters
IJ.

"'I l

levied only two mill levies.

C .A.

§§53-7-9,

53-7-16.

["'int of the budgeting process·

-7-

Neither of these

The budget provisions in U.C.A.

§53-20-2 do not

authorize any tax levy; the levies are separately mandate1.
Section 53-7-18 defines the minimum school program to incluje,
basic, mandatory levy of 23.25 mills.
In order to qualify for receipt of the
state contribution toward the basic program
and as its contribution toward its costs of
said basic program, each school district
shall impose a minimum basic tax levy of
23.25 mills.
u.c.A. §53-7-18.
The second levy is the "voted leeway" which is authorized by
the voters in the district.
mills for the District.

The voted leeway levy is now nine

U.C.A. §53-7-19.

The Code speci fi-

cally excludes these two levies from being determined by refer·
ence to budget estimates.

Since these were the only two lev'eo

in the Di strict, there is no way that the Respondents can be
entitled to a refund because of an allegedly excessive colle:·
tion or levy.
The District by state law must make the first levy: •has a voter mandate to assess up to nine mills on the second
levy.

So long as it operates within the legal limits of the

mill levies, it cannot collect excessive revenue.

State la\..·

and the voters in the District have authorized its actions:
regardless of the budget estimates,

the full legal authorit)

there and has never been exceeded by the District.
Taxpayers dissatisfied by the leeway level may ini·
an election to modify or decrease the leeway upon petiticn
Thus, the law has already provided the remedy to a taxpa1•e·
-8-

'

tl•cit

tl1e leeway has been set at too great a level.

\'a)(payPrs have their legal remedy and the power to control the
Their remedy is not a suit to collect alleged overpayments or to mandate budget processes.

So long as collect-

ions of taxes fall within the limits of the state mandated levy
and the voter-directed leeway, there can be no illegal mill
levy subject to challenge by Respondents.
The Respondents thus have no reason to sue, and no
claim which is cognizable in a court of law.

Their complaints

ahout the mill levy set by the Board under the leeway approved
by their fella.; taxpayers and property a.;ners are not properly
addressed to the courts of this state; they should be addressed
to the voters by petition and through the electoral process.
An injunction should not replace the electoral process or the law.

II.

THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL MILL LEVY.

The Respondents have asserted that the District needed
only

$22,247,476 from property tax revenue to cover the M.& O.

tJudget for fiscal 1981-82.

This figure is $2,774,709 less than

chP S25,002, 185 which was certified by the Board.
Resp<>n•1ents'
l';,•1

'"tt""l r!,,
'11'

,_;_.,]

fi•

Both the

rlaim and the amounts they use are incorrect.
the Bodrl accepted the Respondents'
n•1ll

figures in

IP•Y frir \981-82, and had the Board assessed a
•mount,

the Oistrict would have incurred an

-9-

illegal deficit of $1,695,800.
U .C .A.

not incur a deficit.

By law,

school districts m;;y

§53-20-2.

budget for the next school year,

Thus,

in estimating

the District must be exact to

the penny (an almost impossible task,

given the fact that the

budget is a plan for events which have not yet occurred) or
else come out ahead; it must not come out behind.
the comparative revenues,

As shown bv

expenditures and changes in fund

balances for fiscal years ending in 1981 and in 1982, the
revenue raised through property taxes

(based on the mill levy)

and from other sources (interest on investments, other local
revenue,

state funds,

federal revenue)

for 1981 -82 fe 11 short

of the year's expenditures by almost $350,000.

The Di strict

fortunately had for use an unexpended fund balance from the pre·
vious year to avoid a deficit.

(R.

244)

The same was true fc:

1980-81 when expenditures exceeded tax and other revenues by
almost $2.5 million.
deficit.

(R. 244)

A lower assessment would have caused a
The District used all of the money raised

by the tax levy and needed more money on top of that.

Thus,

the contention of the Respondents that there was an overly
large levy and an excessive collection of tax revenue is
totally inaccurate; the tax revenue was all used.
proposed lower levy,
ful deficit.

At the

the District would have incurred an un'. 2·•

The Appellants did not over-tax.

The courts

should not at tempt to tamper with the mandated and authorize'
levies required for and essential to the school programs.

-10-

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION RESTS
ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS.

l I l -

The Respondents have based their case on erroneous
assumptions,

incorrectly equating three separate and distinct

things and concocting a theory of statutory interpretation to
1ustify their claims.

They have misinterpreted the Contingency

Appropriations Account and unexpended fund balances as being
reserves.

The Respondents have next argued that by law the

District may have only one reserve, the undistributed reserve
authorized by U.C.A. §53-20-2.

Since there are statutory

limitations on the use of that reserve (that it cannot be used
in the negotiation and settlement of contract salaries), they
have reinterpreted this statutory limit to mean that the

undistributed reserve can be spent on such salaries once negot1ations end.

The trial court accepted most of these notions,

hut it did not find the undistributed reserve to be exclusive.
In

its opinion,

some reserves are good, although not spelled

out by statute, but the Contingency Appropriations Account is
''ot

6

-,iood

•_•r

lawful reserve.

These conclusions misapprehend

of the budget process, misuse terms and rest on

h2

;,"r., ;,,.,, s
"1r

·1-1,e
JL 1 111

11i

:Jualysis which are incorrect and unsupported.
,,.1

i

c-

s"hrlol
A

i,{ 1

c:- 1 1 1r1a

t

necessary to explore the problem.

districts in this state use accrual method

dqet,

es

(1·

which is, by statutory definition,

f'.A.

53-7-9) is adopted in June,
-11-

a

before the school's fiscal year begins.

U.C.A.

§SJ-20-2

Appellants collect whatever data is available and examine
previous experience.

They make the best and most accurate

estimates they can of revenues and expenditures, making apprcpriations and commitments in accord with the needs of the
pupils to be served.

When the budget is adopted in June, there

is no way of knowing what events wi 11 occur; no one knows ho,,
many pupils w i 11 enroll,

and so the number of teachers and '.''

exact inventory needs cannot be known.

Teacher salary negotia·

tions are almost never completed by that time,

so the Boarrl ca

only estimate what will be required after negotiations are
concluded.
change.

(R. 484 at 39)

As time progresses,

Salaries and benefits will be settled, and school wi:,

start so the students can be counted.
becomes available.
estimates,
31-34)

the estimates

Other new information

The Board considers new figures and new

and the budget may be revised.

(R.

484 at 20,

It is only when the previous year's budget can be

audited that the actual revenues and expenditures can be
determined; the June budget invariably differs from the auci'.".
budget completed over a year later.
Budgeting is thus performed in an atmosphere of uncer ·
tainty and contingency.

Both revenues and expenditures are

subject to imponderables and changes.
R.

315,

319-20)

(See Golds.

37, 4 9 -'·c

No one can predict what success the Count,

will have in collecting tax revenue;
-12 -

the difference hetwee't

't'>

"Llec11un

u11 the fJ1 strict

and a 95% collection will have a serious impact
Interest rates vary,

may be cut.

federal and state aid

In 1981-82, more than $1.8 million of

expected revenue failed to materialize:
3-1/2% reduction of state aid
Estimated $6 reduction in weighted
pupil unit ("WPU") because of
state appropriation shortfall
Estimated 1980-81 budget WPU
total of all $27,702
Property tax collection short
Interest earnings short of
estimate
Total amount not allowed to be
committed
( R.

$

886,000

166,212
519,281
240,000
$1,811,493

2 36)

On the expenditure side, there can be no foreknowledge
of the number of accidents or their gravity, the number of
pupils at what school level, the affects of weather on utilities or snow removal.

The Board must contend with variables

NhJch include at least the following:
Total property assessed valuation
Percentage collection of taxes assessed
County charges for tax collection
Time taxes collected
Shortfall in state contributions
s across-the-board cutbacks
Sh,)rt fall in federal funds
1 fun.ls
ed interest income
l)(\'
r)\!f:-!l
funds
1J, i r-_, 1 1 t
en r , l l men t
11 • r
,,f t_eachers
1
·r11_,,r sulary negotiations
-,r y cJ111l ">11ppl ies
·,r- I I
l 11<;11
needs
I!µ r1 l t
an, j a CC id en t Cl a i m S
1
i r1Pmr1 I ·'\m1ent
1-1+-le

W•\l kmt-=>11' s

con1pensation and industrial accidents

[continued]
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Sick leave
Substitute teacher costs
Contributions to retirement
Extreme weather (utility bills,
(R. 333)

snCM removal)

With so many variables to contend with,

the budget car.

only be a plan and a prediction based on prior experience;
budgeting is not an exact science.
2.

The Use of the Contingency Appropriations Account.
In such a context of unpredictability and with the

legal requirement that there can be no deficit,
method for accounting must be developed.

some orderly

During the courseo'

the year, adjustments must be made, and some programs must be
kept waiting or held in abeyance unti 1 it becomes more clear
that they can be funded without incurring deficits.

One such

accounting method is the Contingency Appropriations Account:;·
performs a "service" or "function" in the budget by permittinc
the Board to anticipate uncertain revenues and to make appropriations of that revenue -- actual spending will occur only
when the funds materialize.
There are always meritorious programs waiting for
funds;

in 1981-82 the Board had almost $9 million in program

requests which were waiting for approval and funding.
included restoring cuts in programs,
teachers for the gifted students,

$1.6 million; hiring

$.759 million; returnin•J

services to the handicapped to pre-1980-81 level,
increased library book appropriations,
-14-

These

$1 millior·

$.15 million; increa'c

help for elementary and intermediate schools, $.27
,.,illion;

reducing pupil-teacher ratio by 3 students,

$3.988

miilion; and a number of other projects totaling $8,804,776
million.

(R. ;!40-41)

If uncertain revenues come in, then the

Board can consider such programs and implement the most important ones.
In any school budget, the Instruction expenditures are
among the largest; they cover teacher salaries and are approximately 75% of the total M.&

o.

budget.

Contingencies invar-

iably arise in those accounts so the Board placed the Contingency Appropriations Account in the salary portion of the
Instruction budget.

When particular accounts have need for

increased revenue or when revenue has fallen below expected
levels, the Board turns first to the Contingency Appropriations
Account to see if funds are available there; if they are, those
funds will be used first.

They will be redistributed within

the budget framework and spent under a particular descriptive
detail.

(R. 451-52)

The Respondents have failed to understand

th1s relatively simple accounting method,

alleging that the

Contin<Jenry Appropriations Account is a "dummy" account and
tr 1 at

"o expenditures (or only one small one) have ever been

ma i? f, "''" thF <'ont l'hJency Appropriations Account.
1

"'""rl11_.c,;

"'·
1

'lEdn.::;

11

t·"lqPt
r10111

;,1

tl'lP

r,

In the

fiqtlres for 1980-81, more than $1.5 million
C'untingency Appropriations Account.

This

rnillJon of uncertain revenue materialized and
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was thus available for spending during the fiscal

year:

Employee insurance and other fringe costs
Consultant and supervisor salaries
Teacher salaries
Sabbatical leave salaries
Substitute teacher salaries
Tutor salaries
Aide salaries
Teaching supplies
Consultants
Other numerous small amounts

$

43 3' 113

2 3' 088

449, 013

8, 376

36, 567
49' 26:

100,373
104, 84]

62' 61,
294,290

$1,561,539
(R. 337)

In 1976-77,

$1,820,824was distributed from the

Contingency Appropriations Account;

$1,646,650 in 1977-78;

$1,731,856 in 1978-79; and $1,289, 531 in 1979-80.
are detailed at R. 243-46;

248-50;

252-54;

(The figure'

256-58.)

The

account is far from a dummy; the redistributions are duly set
forth in revised and audited budget details for the District.
The Contingency Appropriations Account has been used'
the salary portion of the budget because of the provision ic
U.C.A.

§53-20-2 that the undistributed reserve cannot be use:

in the negotiation and settlement of contract salaries.
other areas of the budget,

Like

contract salaries are plagued by

uncertainties which cannot be predicted in June when the b,idOi'.
must be adopted.
There are other reasons why the Contingency Apprurc'·
tions Account serves useful purposes in the budget.

One ;s

that funds appropriated to particular accounts within the
budget cannot be transferred at will and convenience.
computerized budget control system is specifically proara1TU"'
-16-

so Uii'lt no expenditure will be approved unless there is a
corresponding authorized appropriation to back the expenditure.
(R. 452)

Categorical revenues cannot be redistributed.

(P"452)

As a matter of prudent management, the Board has committed to certain of its department heads or management personnel, called budget managers, that if they can end the fiscal
year under budget (that is, if they can carry out their responsibilities but still economize), any unexpended funds left in
the accounts they administer will be applied toward their
budget appropriations for the following year.

The budget

managers are thus given an incentive to economize: they know
that if they manage efficiently, their own departments will
benefit in the coming year: any savings which they effect will
help them and will not be used to bail out a less efficient
department which has refused to economize or to help one which
has met unforeseeable cost increases.

(R. 452)

The reverse

technique is to cushion each account for contingencies, giving
thE budyet manager more to work with than the minimum and
Ictisir.·1 tltP rossibilily of overspending.
'' -;aµ['tove•l '"''
'H

32J

/-l

1n1l
,].-,.

The cushion method is

y by the Appellants but by the Respondents.
n4-65,

Steph. 54)

'l'he c nit ingency Appropriations Account, when funds come
l"

hP!ps with the martaqement of unforeseeable contingencies

v-i1r_tiout

rc..,,,ciuiring P.xcessive administrative costs and without

-17-

disrupting budget commitments and management incentives.

It

provides a practical and widely used accounting technique for
managing uncertain revenues.
experiences are common,
districts.

The same accounting methods anl

if not universal, among Utah school

(See, e.g. R. 304, reproduced on the following

page)
The Appellants requested an opinion from the State
Superintendent about the propriety of the budget methods
used.

Upon review of the budget process and the law, the

Superintendent has concluded that the Appellants are acting
lawfully.
After reviewing §53-20-2 Utah Code Ann.
(1953), it is my opinion that the Salt Lake
City School District's budgetary actions and
fiscal policies regarding the handling of
fund balances and undistributed reserves have
been in compliance with provisions of
§53-20-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) during each
year sice the 1976-1977 school year until the
present [July 29, 1981].
(R. 296)
The State Superintendent and school board are required by law
to prescribe uniform accounting procedures for the school
districts and to audit their accounts.
The District's budgets have received national awards e'
examples of good accounting principles.

(R. 412-14)

The

budgets are audited annually, and no fault has ever been fo,,c,'
and no illegality or questionable practice has ever been i ,Jeetified

by an auditor with respect to the use of the Conun-

gency Appropriations Account.

(R.

-18-

415,

416,

448)

UTAH SCHOOL DISTRICTS FUND BALANCE
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES

6/30/81
M &0
EXPENDITURE
AI pine

Beaver
Box Elder
Cache
Carbon
Daggett
Dav Is
Duchesne
Emery
Garfield
Grand
G,-anite
Iron
Jordan
Juab
Kane
Hi l 1ard
M6rgan
Nebo
North Sanpete
Piute
San Juan
Sev 1er
Tint ic
Uintah
Washington
Waynp
Murray
llorth Surrrni t
Tooe Ie
Wasatch
'ieber
Sa It lake
Ooden
Logan

FUND
BALANCE

PERCENT OF
EXPENDITURE

39,021,581
1,975,204

2,699,246
254,660

6.92%
12.89

12,924,201
7,933,974
718,029
60 '966, 154
6,797,847
5,557,873
2,357,865
2,844,814
97,732,710

l, 127'149
275, 131
14,856
727,444
117,016
691 ,298
148,609
76,690
6,142,011

8.72
3.47
2.07
1.19
l. 72
12.44
6.30
2.70
6.28

71,359, 161

2,234,088

3.13

1 ''l45. 560
4,325,946
2,333,937
18,938,383
3,111,220
990,693
9,218,619
6,969,966
786,250
8,814,942
9,523,381
1,192,874
9, 145,800
l ,408,403
11,979,558
3,679,418
30,366,'..'85
48,504,696
20,350,333
18,204,918
6,269,567

205'182
326,317
97,929
l,234,849
323,734
143,085
1,779,728
113,926
231 ,299
723,290
317,460
106,929
243,436
206,636
449,918
893,626
2,398,830
3,053,399
1 '161 ,822
641 ,038
309,336

10. 55
7.54
4.20
6.52
10. 41
14.44
19. 31
1. 63
29.42
8.21
3.33
8.96
2.66
14.67
3.76
24.29
7.90
6.30
5. 71
3.52
4.93

(Previous page: EXHIBIT, UTAH SCHOOL DISTRICTS FUND BALANCE AS
A PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES, from Record 304)

The tJndistributed Reserve
a.

Legislative History and Purpose
When Harmer was employed by the Utah Education Associa-

tion, he suggested that school districts should be using
accrual method accounting.

He and others familiar with such

accoirnting and with problems which had developed in the course
of teacher salary negotiations agreed that school districts
needed to have a reserve fund which would not be available for
teacher salaries and which would assist school districts in
handling their budgets under the accrual method.

Harmer worked

with legislators to introduce and enact the statutory provisions necessary to the accrual method.

One of the resulting

provisions is contained in U.C.A. §53-20-2, which authorizes an
cnd1stributed reserve to be isolated from the negotiation and
settlement of contract salaries.

Harmer helped frame the

16nguage and attended sessions on the bill.

It was not his

or that of the bill's legislative sponsors to make this
reserve the sole and exclusive reserve which a
•. ,; ·iisrrj.:t could have; rather, it was the intent to
'.s•• i

a 1 e some money from teacher salaries.

•r•>1
•>ti
1 At
i,_

1

'".1·](1

t-h1:

l11s

When the

1t was routine practice for school districts
•<'sec·,-es.

(See R. 446-47)

Respondent Olson

deposition that Harmer was "instrumental in

-:Jmr-:nJment

to the

law,
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and getting it introduced."

The legislative history of U.C.A.

§53-20-2 gives nn

indication that the reserve there provided was to be exclu 51 ,_,e
or that it would change existing budget practices to prevent
the use of reserves.

The provision was passed with the simple

recognition that employees seeking favorable wage and salary
contracts would push for every possible penny from the budget;
some funds needed to be excluded from the salary negotiations
and contract settlements if the districts were to handle their
budgeting smoothly and efficiently.
The statute is silent as to exclusivity;
permits school districts to create such a

reserve with amounts

Respondents'

not exceeding certain levels.

it simply

expert Goldsberry

and Respondent Stephenson both admitted that the reserve is net
an exclusive one.

(Golds.

101,

Steph.

court did not find it exclusive.

75,

R.

336)

The trial

(See R. 485-98)

It has been the Appellants'

position and their practice

not to use the undistributed reserve in connection with contract salaries,

it is reserved for contingencies in

portions of the budget.
law,

Given this strict observance of the

the Appellants must look elsewhere to meet contingencies

which arise as to salaries which are three-quarters of the
budget.

It is here that the Contingency Appropriations Acc,JC·

comes into use.

It has also been the policy of the Appella:t 3

to look for funds in that account
revenues have come in,

first;

if those

the District uses them hefore it tin"'
-20-

,-1,.., uwL1strit,uted reserve, leaving that funded reserve
intact whe11e,Ier

4.

possi hle.

The Trial Court Has Ignored The Statutory Limits
on The Undistributed Reserve In U.C.A. §53-20-2.
The Respondents have argued for, and the trial court

has apparently concurred in, an incorrect interpretation of the
undistributed reserve provisions in U.C.A. §53-20-2.
process,

In the

the trial court has actually amended the statute.
The statute's purpose was to permit school districts to

reserve some funds which would be isolated from the contract
salary portion of the budget and which would not be available
for salary increases.

Nonetheless, the trial court stated from

the bench:
It appears that the language of the statute
about wages is reasonably clear in its context to relate to the labor negotiating
process, and it's talking about settlements
of contract negotiations and settlement of
the contract, and once that is arrived at,
salaries ordinarily might be one of the more
predictable kind of items in a budget. And
once that's been determined then it seems to
the Court that you are not going back and
dipping into a fund that the legislature has
put beyond the reach of the board, then you
are utilizing it for contingencies in a
a1ea, sickness, or any number of
t1·,1flgs, and that account would certainly be
to cover those contingencies.
(R. 491)
1,

••!<lry portion of any school district budget is one
·1,, this District it represents almost three-

·.,, 1

ers

!'

s c>xpenses

Like any other item in a school

s,::i1'1.rles are tJncertain and subject to

-21 -

unforeseeable variables.

Since the Board has followed the

language and intent of the statute by isolating and keeping
isolated the undistributed reserve from contract salaries, the
Contingency Appropriations Account has aided the District in
meeting contingencies in this area.
Negotiations for contract salaries are almost never
concluded by the time the budget must be adopted; the Board
must make its budget with the negotiations incomplete and must
estimate what it believes it can afford and can negotiate
successfully at the bargaining table.

The one thing which was

considered certain ( unti 1 this decision was rendered) was that
the employees' salary negotiators could not rely on or dip int:
the undistributed reserve.

The District had 1-1/2% of its

M.& o. budget which was isolated from contract salaries.

'lo"'

that limitation has been effectively amended out of the statute.

By the trial court's interpretation,

the teachers kn™

that the reserve is not truly unavailable to them.

They can

hold out for greater increases because they know that as soon
as the negotiations end, the money from the undistributed
reserve will be released and can be spent for contract salaries.

Not only is the statutory exception ignored, but th•

teachers and others with contract salaries know that they c·e
force the Board to use that money; the undistributed reserve
right back in the negotiations and settlement of contract
salaries.

The Board no longer has lines beyond 'which salary
-2 2 -

I'•) ()

t_ l °J

.::i.

The Board is no longer bargaining

,--, I '.__,

µt._i1_2· tP'l

to meet other needs.

re\:eriue

The trial court

•a• clearly incorrect in its interpretation of the statutory
ronditlons imposed upon the expenditure of the undistributed
reserve,

This Court should declare that the statute means what

it says'

that the undistributed reserve is not to be used in

contract salary negotiations or settlements.
).

The Unexpended Fund Balances.
An unexpended fund balance means that the actual expen-

ses have fallen short of predicted levels or else revenue has
exceeded expectations,
been left at year-end.

so that some funds or some inventory has
State law requires such funds to be

ca1ried over to the next year's budget.

u.c.A.

§53-20-2.

Some

of these funds will be earmarked into particular categories
Oecause they derive from categorical revenue; some are
ear'llarked because of the management commitments made by the
to its bu<iget managers.

These fund balances do not

lerive only from or equate to funds set forth in the
Contin3ency Appropriations Account.
f1r'iny 1,1,e next page is a Comparative Statement of
r,1pendi ''"es and Changes in Fund Balance, comparing
., 1

1 ..

ne 30,

1982 and June 30,

1981.

( R.

234)

The District had, as of July 1,

unappropriated fund

balances of $4,571,294 -- funds carried over from the prior
fiscal year according to the requirements of U.C.A.

§53-20-2.

In that same year, the District received revenues of $46
million, but incurred expenses of over $48.5 million -- an
excess of expenditures in the amount of $2.4 million over
year's revenues.

That deficiency was in effect covered from

the fund balances; at the end of the fi seal year, the District
was able to carry over,

for the 1981-82 fiscal year, a fund

balance of $2,173,885.

Thus, by the end of that fiscal year,

there <Nas a fund balance slightly over $1 million to be carrie!
over to the next budget.

Even with that balance, the Di strict

spent more than it received from taxes,

so there was no exces·

sive levy.
The unexpended fund balances can be traced from year '.c
year.

Their amounts are reported in the budget estimates anc

in the audited reports.

They are not evidence of a reserve er

of a hidden Contingency Appropriations Account account; they
simply show that the District was able to end the year withac'.
spending every penny that it had available;
some funds for the next year.

it carried over

Unexpended fund balances aro

no way improper or unlawful; they are contemplated by the
which has made provision for them.

-24-

u.c.A.

§53-20-2.

\d . :

tlAINTENAtlCE AtJD OPERATION FUND
(The General Fund)
·0mparat1ve Statement of Revenues, Expendutures and Changes
in Fund Balance
Years Ended June 30,

1982

Re\7€nues:

Property taxes
Interest on investment
Other local revenue
State of Utah
Federal government
Total Revenues

,0

re

1982 and 1981

Expenditures:
/\dministration
Instruction
Attendance-Health Services
Pupil Transportation
Operation of plant
Maintenance of plant
fixed Charges
Student body activities
Community services
Total Expenditures (Note
Excess (deficiency) of Revenues
over Expenditures
fund Balances Unappropriated -

1981

$24,865,914
2,321,115
748' 724
19,898,891
3,699,906

$22,240,934
1,240,934
786,699
16,923,733
4,613,702

51,504,550

46,128,666

657,143
31,202,383
412,815
659,390
4,544,643
1,617,376
11,000, 905
72,204
1,683,702

615,194
29,463,761
393,715
597,151
4,066,039
1.571,105
9,652,838
67,704
2,136,458

51,850,552

48,563,965

(346,002)

(2,435,299)

July 1

Decrease in reserve for encumbrances
fJecr.,ase in P.1 .. 874 Revenue
reserved for succeding year's budget
IncrE-o.r::c
1-11 •

ln

J 11 'e11

.=,r1,-es

-t,._,c.

r_ory reserve

T1n;;pl1rupr lated

1111.'1r1°

53,356
(833,673)

- June 30

statements.

$1,078,909

( ! 2 , 173

.ss"S)

(Previous page:

EXHIBIT, COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF REVENUES,

EXPENDITURES AND CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE, Record 234)

One peculiar aspect of this case is the extent to which
the Respondents,

particularly by their expert witness, have

admitted away their case.
involves discretion,

They have admitted that budgeting

that contingencies can and do occur in

every aspect of the revenue and expenditure sides of the
hudget, that the undistributed reserve is not exclusive, that
budgeting through the Contingency Appropriations Account is
more prudent than cushioning accounts, that the District's
budgets have been reasonable when the amounts of any unexpended
fund balances are compared to the total budget and, signifi-

cant!y, that the Respondents are unable to suggest alternative
methods which the District could adopt to get better budgets or
mere accurate estimates in June for the events of the coming
year.

Goldsberry,
1n

a certified public accountant specializing

municipal accounting,

testified at a deposition as an expert

''rl hel1alf of the plaintiffs.

His credentials are impeccable.

The Respondents contend that the undistributed reserve
'l-1'?% nf the M.& O. budget) described in U.C.A. §53-20-2
• l><si ve
_,_.-;s1•P1. J

,r.:.

reserve fund that the District can have.
1a.l

position was:

Tt's your position or your opinion that any fund

halanrP in excess of one and a half percent would be
1n1;iutr1or 1 zed and illegal 7

Yes.

(Golds. 14, R. 309)

-2 5-

However,

shortly after setting forth this position, Goldsberr

began admitting exceptions to it,

and before his deposition'"'

finished, his admissions were so broad and so numerous that h•
had made a full-scale retreat from the Respondents' basic
premise.
Q
Under the law, in your opinion, can the
district create a reserve for inventories?

A

Yes.

Under the law, in your opinion,
create a reserve for self insurance?
Q

A

can they

Yes.

Do you know of any other reserves that they
might create that would be admissible under the law?
Q

A
I be 1 i eve they've been using public law 874
money in the reserve.
Q
When we said that they could have a reserve
for inventories and self insurance, can that be in parof the one or is that in addition to?

A
No.
I believe that's in addition to.
(Golds. 101, R. 336, emphasis added)
Goldsberry also admitted that the Board must deal wit'.
many variables on both sides of the ledger.
imponderable,

the number of pupils who will attend, thus

affecting state aid,
is not fixed.

Federal aid is

is unpredictable,

(Golds.

48 R. 318)

and even interest

The Board would not even

know in May, when it is working on the tentative budget, how
much revenue it could carry over to the next fiscal year.
(Golds. 49 R.

319)

Expenditures, he agreed,

also vary.

Q
Are you familiar with the fact that in the
Salt Lake City School District that they are sdfinsurers for health and accident, industrial

-26-

n·

c ident and unemployment payments?

Yes, I believe I knew that.
And aren't those variables that no one can
tell wllat will happen in a particular year?
A

u

A

Yes.

(Golds. 49-50, R. 319-20)

Goldsberry agreed that the Board could not know in advance
about unemployment compensation, inventory changes based on
pupil enrollment, teachers' sick leave, the number of substitute teachers that would be needed.

(Golds. 50, R. 320)

In sum:

A
Okay.
Expenditure side, variables[,]
weather could be a factor, maybe snow removal would be
a factor, maintenance could be a factor.
You could
have variables in every one of your accounts, revenue
and expenditures.
!Golds. 37, R. 315, emphasis added).

He also says the Board

has discretion in dealing with the budget.
Q

different.

Well, do they have some discretion?

That's

A
They have some discretion when the make the
budget, that is correct.
Golds. 29, R. 311, emphasis added)
Q
My question is, was it appropriate for the
board to make some allowances for those kind of
unforeseen contingencies?

Yes.
To weight that budget for that possi(Golds. 38, R. 316)

A

bl lit y

The question the11.
.. ,,e"r
' !

r) \

·,., 1.1
1

n,

•t

is how can they exercise their discretion?

increase the hudget for separate i terns and

=:il11011

jn

the accounts.

1t isn't really a very good policy to put
in a budget and say, "I want you to come in
!Juclqet," it's better to have a tight budget and

"u·o;hicrn

1e•

;nv

1-,,

them,

"I want

you to come in on budget."
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Isn't

that the way to approach it?
A

Nonetheless,

Ideally,

yes.

(Golds.

64-65,

R.

323-24)

some provisions need to be made for the imponder-

ables of budgeting,

and Goldsberry himself would probably try

to make provision for them.

(Golds.

38-39,

R.

316-17, emphas's

added.)
Q
The concept, without defining reasonable, ari
you willing to agree that there can be some reasonable
percentage of tolerance that the school board can
exercise?

A
Yes.
Without calling for a conclusion on my
part, yes,-I-can say that.
(Golds. 32-33, R. 313-14,
emphasis added.)
Q
If the estimated revenues is within a range
of 0 to 5 percent, wouldn't you think that that's
showing some responsibility?

Q
From a hindsight standpoint and, again,
forgetting about the technicality of the one and a ha"
percent thing, let's just talk about a budget that naj
be 62 million dollars, and if they come in within three
or four percent of having appropriated and spent
three or four percent of the revenues which, in fact,
came in, would you say that that would be within
reasonable limits? .
A
Okay.
You' re also allowed approximately ore
and a half percent of that 62 million dollars or
$ 900, 000 in that reserve account.
I would say for a
specific time frame that probably the two and a half
million dollars as a result of the events is reasonable.
Your question is, is what we do with that two
and a half millions when we budget that the follawi ng
year.
(Golds. 32-33, R. 313-14, emphasis added)
The contested amount in this suit is approximately $2.8 mill!.
dollars in the pre-audit unexpendecl fund balance or $ l mi 1 L.
audited,

an amount well within Goldsberry' s reasonable

The question is still how to deal with those
balances.
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fjqu·

f•inc

Q
If the school district doesn't know for sure
ho•,i much money it's going to receive, don't you think
1t wnuld be proper not to allocate in advance those
but if the funds do, in fact, come in, then
utilize them for projects that are standing in the wing
!eady to be implemented?

A
Surely.
(Golds. 72-73, R. 325-26, emphasis
added, see also R. 243-46)
Goldsberry has now fully agreed with the position of the school
defendants.
After all of these admissions, Goldsberry admitted even
further that he does not know a method which the school defendants could use to handle the budget better.
Q
(BY MR. BUSHNELL) You talk about a fund.
I
call it contingency appropriated funds.
It's a contingency because they don't know what money they're
going to get and the expenses they're going to have.
Don't you think they have the right to provide some
mechanism for those eventualities, regardles of whether
you like the term; don't you think they have the right
to provide for those eventualities.
THE WITNESS:
They have the right in their
individual line items to provide for that.
Q
(BY MR. BUSHNELL) You're talking about the
mechanics of how they do it. Let's take it a step at a
time.
Do you agree that the Board of Education has the
right, and I'll go so far as the duty, to provide for
eventualities of overexpenditures and underreceipt of

income?

Yes.
(BY MR. BUSHNELL)
It would be a responsible
lhinq f,:;1 the board to do, isn't that true?
A

U
A

,•
,.,,1,

thF1t

..... 111r,11ds1 s

Tt would be a responsible thing.

I.Pt's go the next step where you want to go
1s, that you don't agree with the mechanics
tloP:cdi:2_it, isn't that right?
That's correct.
(Golds. 59-60, R. 321-22,
ndcled)
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Goldsberry' s testimony shows that there is no substance to n .•
Respondents'

complaint; there is only a question of account inc

form.
Q
How do they do that,
in your opinion?

then,

to do it proper!

A
Well, I think I've referred to that in
earlier testimony, based on their history of events.

Q
Let's take the history that every year
there's things that they didn't anticipate both as to
expenditures and as to revenue.
One year it might not
be Federal funds, one year it may be the Governor
cutting it back, one year it might be lack of collections, another year it might be utilities running over,
another year, it might be teachers, but the history has
been that there has been some of those
i terns each year.
Starting with that assumption, you told us
you don't want it in a particular line item and you
don't want across the board percentage increase in all
of the accounts.
Tell me how they can properly work i•
out so that they don't fall short?
A
Well, you know, I feel like the criteria tha'.
has developed over the years in performing that budget
is the criteria that you use in preparing that budget.
Q
And the criterion has said we have to do it.
But I'm asking you mechanically how they do that.

A
That's how they do it.
criteria.

They evaluate that

Q
We' re talking about the need and method that
we carry it forward.
I'm having you assume that
there's a need based upon the criteria from prior year;
and I'm now asking you to tell me how is the proper
method to do it since you don't like the one we've
already talked about, one, a contingency factor in
every account or a contingency account.
What is there
left that we can do to guard against that?

A
I've a 1 ready gone on record as saying the
contingency account to me is misleading and imprope•
disclosure.
Q
I've said that.
You said it woul<1 be irnpr.
per to take a certain percentage and apply it all
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the accounts?
A
I said that. You would have to look at the
specific account you're budgeting for and look at the
rriteria that makes that account out. You're asking me
to be specific, you know, asking me to be specific for
a specific budget item or something.
Q
No, I'm not.
I'm going to do it again
because I think you're really -- at this point you've
said what we do is wrong, but you haven't told us what
we can do to make it right.
Let me give you the
hypotheticals.
The hypotheticals are that the history
has been that we'll have shortfalls in various accounts
and we'll have overexpenditures sometimes in various
accounts and they don't consistently follow to be the
same one.
One time it might be teachers, public utilities, one time it might be supplies on what we were
overexpending and on the other side sometimes the money
is collections from the county, sometimes it's failure
to get the State funds, sometimes it's the Governor
arbitrarily cuts everything off through there.
That's
the history.
As a responsible school board they have
said, "I don't know what it's going to be this year,
but we need to protect ourselves so that we don't
violate the law and spend more money than what we have
appropriated." My question is, with that
problem presented, how is a proper way to do it?

A
Well, I guess I can't answer your question.
All I know is what has transpired, that they have
actually collected more than they have spent.
(Golds.
93-96, R. 329-32, emphasis added)
In other words, Respondents' expert does not know how else the
Schoo\ Board can handle the budget; he cannot offer a better
method or a clearer form.

With such admissions, there is no

issue for the Court to resolve.

The Appellants face contin-

'Jer.cies on beotl1 si<'les of their balance sheet, they have discre- ''-'"
I

th2v

1
·IC

"r"' "''t confined to a 1-1/2% total fund balance, the
'"'t

ri1p1_ i

-,,.·, 1 '"1

e<cJusive,

they should not cushion budgets, they

',"'-1r>qe11cies as they arise.

They have a method for

the l•uliget which Respondents dislike but do not know
-31-

how to improve.

Apparently, the Appellants just do not ma,e

their estimates as accurately as the Respondents would lii<e,
although the unexpended fund balances are reasonable in amocc.·
given the uncertainties and the size of the budget.
Respondents' expert admits that there is no substance or meri:
to the complaint; this case is all a matter of form.
IV.
1.

THE TRIAL COURT CONFUSED ITS TERMS AND RELIED
ON EXTRA-RECORD MATERIAL

Since There Is No Exclusive Reserve, Reserves Cannoo
Be Distinguished by the Trial Court.
The trial court accepted the Respondent's unsupporte:

assertion that the Contingency Appropriations Account is a
reserve, but it rejected the Respondents'

argument that the

District may maintain only one reserve, the undistributed
reserve authorized by U.C.A. §53-20-2.

The trial court is

correct that the undistributed reserve is not exclusive; lec:i 0•
lative history, school practice before and since
of the undistributed reserve and the State Superintendent al:
show the propriety of other reserves.
However, the trial court made an unsupported choice
among reserves, designating some as good and others as not.
The trial court decided that the Contingency Appropriations
Account is not a good reserve; it felt it had been
the Appellants in excess of their authority.

That suppose'

reserve is allegedly different from reserves for inventor,·'
self-insurance because the trial court considers them to
-3 2 -

more open to public scrutiny than the Contingency
Appropriations

(R. 488-89)

The striking thing to the Court in terms
of the account that we're talking about is
that even those that are not specified by
statute, namely the reserve for inventory and
the reserve for self-insurance, notwithstanding that they are not in the statute, they
are not contingent kinds of items, as such,
and they are identified kind of expenditures.
(R. 488-89, emphasis added)
The Contingency Appropriations Account, assuming that it is a
reserve (which the School Appellants do not concede), had been
used to cover contingencies when uncertain revenues had come
in.

But distinguishing reserves for inventories and self-

insurance from that Account because they are not "contingent"
is fallacious.

Inventory is not a stable, predictable item.

The items in inventory vary according to changes in the curriculum,

the number of students, the number of teachers and the

costs of the items themselves.

Costs vary with inflation,

scarcity of materials and other factors.
ever

Such factors vary

they raise contingencies, and a reserve for inven-

tory must manage contingencies and be operated in a context of
chanoe. much of it unforeseeable.
Self-insurance deals with even greater numbers of
No one knows which teachers will fall ill or be
expenditures from the self-insurance
·e.

'o c" L ' ' " 1

''"
01

knows when an ankle will be broken rather than
.,..

h y a cut on a teacher' s hand needed ten stitches
-33-

but missed an artery or a tendon.

Insurance, by its very

nature, deals with probabilities and contingencies, not
certainties.

The trial court's distinction between different

kinds of reserves simply does not bear analysis.

If these

other reserves for inventory and insurance are legal
specified by statute, then the undistributed reserve cannot be
exclusive.

Surely the statute does not permit trial courts to

accept or reject reserves on the basis of their unsupported
views that some things are contingent and others are not
(though common sense says those things are in fact contingent)
The Contingency Appropriations Account,

not being a reserve,

cannot be prohibited by the trial court's analysis; U.C.A.
§53-20-2 does not prohibit contingency appropriations and does
not create an exclusive reserve.

It does not permit the tria'.

court to approve some reserves, misclassify an accounting
method as a reserve and then enjoin its use.

The trial court

recognized that it was dealing with an accounting case (R. 486
but failed to recognize and distinguish accounting principle
methods and terms.

The trial court said:

At the outset, the Court observes that
this is an accounting case, not a levy case,
not a tax case, not an assessment case ....
(R. 486, emphasis added)
Despite this,
and methods.

the trial court ignored accounting ter·,

The trial court disregardeo the only factual

evidence in the record - that of Goldsberry and Harmer.
is an expert in the field; he is a member of the Natinnal

,:oun,

1

I

,[ ,-;,,

'er nmental Accountants ( "NCGA") - the group which

sets tLe standards for generally accepted accounting principles
for

qovernmental agencies.

Harmer is also chairman of the

NCGA's Technical Guidance Committee which routinely provides

technical advice on handling difficult problems of accounting
to governmental agencies.
2.

(R. 484 at 49)

The Court Went Outside the Record
In Making Its Decision.
In its oral decision, the trial judge, a former Public

Service Commissioner,

commented that Emery County's school

board had accumulated reserves of several million dollars from
rn1nes and from utilities, and that other school districts had
created reserves and were less responsible than this District.
The trial court said:
In Erner y County I don't know where they got
their reserve, but they gave testimony before
the Public Service Commission that they had a
reserve figure of, it seems to me, six or
eight or ten million dollars, a fairly significant amount of money which could have
built more school space, to be sure, without
hav1ng to rely on capital funds or on bond
issuPs at all.
A.nd they profited from the
m111,"s anJ from the Utah Power & Light plants
an,4 s,, fnrth, and then were screaming at the
Publir= Service Commission because we were
1c1
take part of the tax base away by
)..,, 1
n'J lltah Power & Light sell it to the
'"1"1,_·1palities that weren't subject to taxes.
11,i,11' yo11 see examples in various
',,, L' i" Ls where they have developed very
reserves which exceed Salt Lake
'1ty's """really don't have the responsibil1•1,,,., that the Salt Lake City board has.
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So I sort of think that the legislature
intended that there be something more consistent about how school boards operate than
what's being accomplished in terms of the
current budgeting process.
(R. 496)
Thus,

the trial court was influenced by the testimony of a

different school board before a different public agency on a
different matter.

This case was apparently used as a vehicle

for rectifying another grievance from another time and place.
Such should not be the basis for or an influence upon injunctive relief against these Appellants.
3.

The Contingency Appropriations Account Is Not Secrefr,.
or Mysterious.

0

The trial court was also incorrect in believing that V·
Contingency Appropriations Account was not open to public sere
in the same way that a reserve for self-insurance or inventory
would be available.
such a conclusion.

There is no evidence in the record to sup::
There are no allegations of any procedural

regularity other than the creation of the Contingency Appropn·
ations Account.
The Contingency Appropriations Account was present ir. ·
budget during each of the years mentioned by the complaint.
budget was adopted after public hearing.

There is

evidence of public scrutiny of the budget each year.
UTA itself,

1n<lee•4,

sponsor of the suit, has analyzed the budgets e:i

year; UTA was represented by its executive director Olson or
research analyst Stephenson at the budget hearings.
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In bct'1

·,·:ritten and oral statements, they commended each year's budget and
concurred

01

supported adoption of the budgets.

15: Steph. 47)

(See Olson 13,

They scrutinized and approved the budget each

ye;i.r until 1981-82: the fiscal year when the Board imposed its
first increase in the mill levy in three years.

(See R. 301)

When the 1982-83 budget hearings were held, after the
commencement of this suit, Olson again appeared on behalf of
the UTA,

and he again complimented the Board on its budget.

At

the hearing, Olson questioned Harmer about the Contingency
Account (account 0210.99).

Olson asked:

What is the purpose of 0210.99? Maybe I've
never understood the definition of that.
(R. 411, emphasis added)
In a nutshell,

that is the problem with this case:

the

executive director of UTA, the UTA and the parties it has
snlicited have sued because of confusion about an accounting
an undistributed reserve and an unexpended fund balanre.

Injunctive relief to interfere with the discretion of a

school board in preparing and operating its budgeting must rely
un

hi ng mnr;o than misunderstanding and confusion.

s0n1<0t

There

's ,· r11J,' ng what sue •ter in this record to meet the criteria for
r c_·l 1 et
·1,_

'lt

1

(See Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil

tr'"' court's decision must be reversed; it
assumptions and incorrect analysis.
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V.
1.

THE REMEDY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
IMPROPER AND INAPPROPRIATE

Attempts to Enjoin Taxation.
When the Respondents originally commenced this action,

they obtained a temporary restraining order to restrain the
Appellants from setting the mill levy for the coming fiscal
year at their proposed level and to require the mill levy to
set at a lower rate.

Because U.C.A.

from enjoining taxes,

the Respondents were denied a prelirninar;·

injunction.

§59-11-10 prohibits court;

They amended their complaint, stating their new

theory about the impropriety of the Contingency Appropriations
Account, still seeking to interfere with the District's
and budgeting procedures.
The trial court has granted two forms of injunctive
relief:

a prohibitory injunction to prevent the Appellants

from using the Contingency Appropriations Account and a
tory injunction to require that the Appellants make expenditures from the undistributed reserve.
The object of these injunctions is still to interfere
with taxing by the Appellants.

The Respondents'

their use of fundamental terms,

is somewhat roundabout and of

questionable effectiveness.

theory, like

Apparently the Respondents belie•;e

that if there is no Contingency Appropriations Account there
will be no reserve and no unexpended fund balances.

RequirJ'•·'

the District to use its undistributed reserve instea<l of the
Contingency Appropriations Account (despite statutory liinita·

-38-

,10ns on the fund)

is apparently designed to reduce unexpended

fund balances and to reduce mill levies.

Respondents' attack

on lhe Contingency Appropriations Account, their theory of
exclusive reserve and their concern with unexpended fund balances demonstrate one thing:

they are trying to do indirectly

1•hat the law prohibits them from doing directly.

They still

want to enjoin taxing authority.
In point of fact, part of the injunctive relief is
meaningless.

The budget can be designed without the Contin-

gency Appropriations Account.

Since the budget adopted each

June is an estimate, and since the Contingency Appropriations
Account lists revenue the Board hopes for but cannot count on,
the budget can simply be drafted without appropriation of such
revenues.

If those revenues later materialize, the Board can

re·; i se the budget, appropriate the newly arrived funds and
commit and expend them for needy accounts.

The Contingency

Appropriations Account will be absent and will affect the mill
levy no more than it does now (which is not at all).

Once it

is understood that the Contingency Appropriations Account is
merely an accounting methodology to provide an orderly way to
•nticipate and appropriate uncertain revenues, the injunctive
'

1

·11,cf

ii<--c<)mes meaningless.

The Board cannot rely on uncertain

tn cover the heart of its programs; it must seek more
J2"11<Jt'".
'

11

"

111<>rp

certain revenue from its levying mandates in

"'eet the needs of the District and to prevent a
-39-

deficit.

Courts should not involve themselves in meaningles,

exercises such as enjoining the use of the Contingency Appropriations Account.
Injunctive relief ... is not appropriate where
there would be little or no benefit to the
complainant.
Penelke, Inc. v. John Price
Associates, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah
1982)
The mandatory injunction to require expenditures from
undistributed reserve is relief of a somewhat different nature
and will be discussed below.
VI.

COURTS SHOULD NOT MANDATE ACCOUNTING OR
BUDGETING METHODS FOR THE DISTRICT

It is well settled in this state that courts should net
issue mandates to compel administrators to perform in a specifie manner first,

absent a clear ministerial duty or second,

when discretion is involved.
this principle on both counts.

The instant decision violates
The trial court has ordered fr,e

Appellants to make expenditures for contingencies from the
undistributed reserve,

regardless of circumstances and wi t>iout

regard to statutory limitations on that reserve.

It has aiso

enjoined the use of an accounting technique in a budgeting
process which must cope with estimates and which must rest on
discretion.

Neither is the proper subject of injunctive

relief.
Utah law was restated in Tuttle v. Board of EducatL
of Salt Lake City,

294 P.

294

(Utah 1930).

Plaintiff there

sought a writ of mandate to compel the Board to use certain
-40-

in the school budget which had been used
:1i

1i .

,,,1,11Js

The Supreme Court denied the relief, con-

;/ea.rs

eluding that

the budget categories were substantially equiva-

Jent to those used in prior years.

The Supreme Court stated:

There is a further question involved.
Mandate does not lie unless the relator or
petitioner shows a clear legal right to the
performance of the act demanded and a plain
duty of the officer, board, or other tribunal
to perform it as demanded, and where the duty
to perform the act is doubtful, or where a
discretion is imposed or involved in the
performance of it, mandate ordinarily will
not compel the performance of it in a particular way or manner. We have held that many
times.
That in making and adopting a budget
some discretion and judgment is imposed on
and is required by the board may not well be
doubted.
The statute does not prescribe the
kind of classification of titles and accounts
to be made by the board, or how full and
complete it is to be made, whether by only a
general classification or to what extent the
classification is required to descend to
particulars or details.
The requirement of
the statute in such particular is that the
classification shall be equivalent to the
district's classification.
But how or in
what manner the district's classification is
to be made, or how the classification is to
be made to appear, or to be ascertained or
determined, likewise is not prescribed. From
all this it is apparent that to compel the
board to make a particular kind of budget, or
Orie
speci fi call y demanded by the plaint1 f fs, r·,r to direct what subjects or stateme.1ts .,;:--;;;numerations or details are to be
st_dt•:·I Ln-the-budget and to compel or coerce
make such or any particular kind
- I•
1__ is, to say the least, of very
,1
.L."-'!'riety
Tuttle, supra, 294 P. at
r11

-·

,.:.mj

1

1

s

arlCfeo.
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The Tuttle decision determined that accounts are ger
eral statements or summaries; petitioner in Tuttle had no riqc"
to mandatory relief to compel the use of or supervise the
administrative details of the District's budget.
Here, the trial court has imposed a mandate or injunction to require spending from the District's undistributed
reserve.

Such relief is not justified by the tests of the law

Section 53-20-2 does not require a school district to create a·.
undistributed reserve;

the statute has "authorized" the Dis-

trict to "adopt a budget containing an amount known as the
undistributed reserve."

If a school district exercises this

authority, the reserve must meet the statutory limitations
provided.

But that reserve arises in a climate of discretion:

the Appellants prepare the budget to meet the needs of the
population they serve.

As Respondents admit, budgeting in-

volves discretion; budgeting rests on estimates which inherently involve discretion and choices.

(See U. C. A. § 5 3 - 7-9 I

It is not for courts to impose mandates on the Appellants ate·:"
what funds to spend;

it is equally improper for a court to

prohibit the Appellants from using a specific account item er•
particular accounting method,

especially when the techf'igue

follows generally accepted accounting principles approve·l
the State Board of Education.
its injunctive orders,

The trial court erred in

tv•rt

and it erred in its asserrion that

was not an area of discretion.

The injunctive relief must

dissolved.
-4 2 -

e:•
1

SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD
UNLESS THFRE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
OR CLEAR ILLEGALITY

, l r

The Respondents have failed to show that there has been
3

ny

abuse of ,11scretion on the part of the Appellants or any

one of them.

The only suggestion of abuse came from Olson who

fo0nd the Appellants "ultra-conservative" in their approach to
rlie budget.

(Olson 40-41)

Not only is "ultra-conservative"

difficult to define in the context of the budget process, it
nas nothing to do with abusing discretion or violating the law.
In1unctive relief is not justified.
It is now well settled in this state that the courts
will not interfere with the actions taken by school boards
1inless an action clearly abuses discretion or violates the law.
The IJt-ah Supreme Court set the standard of judicial review in
Beard v. Board of Education,

81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900, 903 (1932):

It is well established that, i f the action of
the board of education is within the powers
conferred upon it by the Legislature, and
pertains to a matter in which the board is
vested with authority to act, the courts will
not review the action of such a board or
substitute its judgment for that discreti0n
"The courts will not interfere with
e'ercise of discretion by school d1recmatters confided by law to their
Judgment
oJnless there is a clear abuse of
the rl;-c;cretion, or a violation of law.
So
tl-,e
ts ace usually disinclined to inter-regulations adopted by school
1s
,;rid they will not consider whether
11ol 11 l!Jns are wise or expedient, but
,-, 1
"1,,-1_1,er they are a reasonable exercise
ct thp rower and discretion of the board.
•

'"'"'

1
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Acting reasoriably ·,..•ithin the powers conferred, it is the province
the boari

education to determine what things are ietrigood
order, and discipline of the schools and the
rules required to produce these conditions.
The presumption is ah;ays in favor of the
reasonableness and propriety of a rule or
regulation duly made.
The reasonableness of
regulations is a question of law for the
courts."
(Citations omitted, emphasis
added)

nental to the successful

This standard was reaffirmed in Petty v. Utah State 3oar:
Reaents,

595 P.2d 1299,

1302

(Utah 1979),

in ·w'1ic!-.

assessments made by t'1at 3oard had been questioned:
Applicable to this review, it is appropriate
to r"ea::i!"!11. our comrnit:nent to t:'1ese ge!"'lera:..
propositions:
that an
aaencv
should be a:lo;.1ed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion in performing i<:s responsi2ilities anC that the cocrts
n8t
intrude or interfere therew i t'.1. unless t'."\e
it

or

is so oppressive or
that
be
capricious anj
agency has in some way acted cont!"ary

to law or in excess of its aut'.1.ority.
sistent
that policy
are not

CCJr.-

to S.isa;ree

the vie-...· o: t:"'.e trial cot.:rt
tha-: assessment of the $1)5 student fee was
t!-le po,.;e::- of the Board of Re?e:.ts.
omitted, emphasis

In applying t'1is standard to the School 3oard's

Education
1112,

1114

:i:.v v.
(1923):

exc:Jsive

p..:.C:.i::: sc'.-'.oc:
cc:i..::1:y gc·:er:-::-.er.:., ar..:.

by

by

:c=a:

tea:-= =£

:s

£2r

i:-:2e?e:-.::e:-.t c: :...--.e

1

i : :_';-.e -s.r-c-.::-.: :-e-

_:e: t; :a,.;

it is the duty of the county
to
such per cent on the
assesca: pr=perty of the city as will raise
E=ard has adopted cautious budget practices; it
i:o spend :no!1ey until i"': is certain it is there.

.:::-:

the 3oard for being ' ultra1

,

the Respondents cannot argue that being
Caution does not violate the law.

CREDIT
OF
DISTRICT IS
PC..:..CE::l .:..T RlSK BY THE I:\CORRECT
OF
TRIAL COURT
f=r
·-._7:-.es:

past several years the District has received
:ro:-'"! t":"':e e!'ltities which rate credit-worthiness,

These high ratings influence the
:-.ar<:e-: a;,.:; ha»:e permitted the District to enter the

e:.:

nari(ets at favorable rates.
1n

One

ratings is the soundness of the

its favorable funds balances have not
!!1.terest rates are

conditions and any applicable

by

are a:so i:-ifluenced by the financial
(?.

230-31,

:he

:2

453)

:avorable fund positio!"l.

District's top rating.

I'o was

change in rating.

--r . ) -

Respondents seek, by trying to reduce the District's unexpende'
fund balances, will have an adverse impact on the credit wort>
iness of the District.

(R.

230-31)

Each year the District borrows up to $7 million on ta•·
anticipation notes to finance its M.& O. budget.
redeemed as tax revenues are collected.

(R.

The notes au

453)

The Respondents'

argument below did not address annual borrN-

ings for the M.&

o.

budget.

Changes in the District's budget

techniques, court findings of illegality and injunctive contrc:
of the budgeting process can only injure and confuse the
District's actual financial standing.

The trial court's con-

clusion that the financial standing of the District is not at
risk is unsupported on the record; the only evidence
was that of the Appellants who recounted the status of the
District's rating and its fragile nature.
If the District is forced by injunction to dip into
reserves which it has previously left intact because it has
been able to use contingent revenues through the Contingent
Appropriations Account before using those reserves,

then it car

anticipate an adverse reaction from the rating agencies,
in its credit rating and a corresponding increase in the cos.
of borrowing money.

The District faces harm which it cannnt

repair because of the relief granted by the trial court·

TLe

balance of hardship between the few disguste<l taxpayers anl r"
District clearly tilts away from a grant of injunctive relief
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CONCLUSION
The District has made only the two mandated leeways and
has expended all the tax monies collected from those levies.
Roth the taxing and budgeting actions taken by the Appellants
have been lawful and proper.

Consequently, there is no basis

for a refund to the Respondents or for any other relief.

The

Appellants respectfully request that this Court dissolve both
parts of the injunction that has been granted against them and
that it make such declarations as it may deem necessary to
permit the continued use of the Contingency Appropriations
;ccount, to declare that the undistributed reserve in U.C.A.
j53-20-2 is not the exclusive reserve which the District may

ha:e in its budget, and to declare that the undistributed
reserve in U.C.A. §53-20-2 shall not be used at any time for
the negotiation,

"atecJ:

settlement or payment of contract salaries.

Salt Lake City, Utah
July 8, 1983
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for the Appellants

an 5.
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